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• From July 2002 to March 2003, the Bank of
Canada’s regional offices surveyed a representative
sample of 170 Canadian firms to better understand
price-setting behavior in the Canadian economy.
• Results suggest that half of Canadian ﬁrms
changed prices at least once every three months.
The survey also found evidence of increased price
ﬂexibility among Canadian ﬁrms over the past
decade, owing to intensiﬁed competition and
greater use of information technologies.
• The survey tested theories as to why ﬁrms allow
prices to respond sluggishly to changes in market
conditions—a key issue in determining the effects
of monetary policy. Many ﬁrms indicated that
their prices do not change until costs change, and
that they often take measures to delay raising
prices when costs go up. Firms also recognized
that adjusting prices ahead of their competition is
risky, which causes them to wait. Fixed nominal
price contracts create rigidities, and the most
commonly cited duration is 12 months. Finally,
ﬁrms keep prices unchanged out of fear of
antagonizing customers with frequent price
changes.
• If prices are relatively ﬂexible and have become
more ﬂexible over time, inﬂation may be more
responsive to interest rate changes; thus, inﬂation
targets may be achieved with shorter lags and
fewer real side effects. Moreover, greater price
ﬂexibility may reduce the need for countercyclical
policy.
etting prices correctly plays a critical role in
determining the success of a product or service
toafirm.Theprocessofchoosingandsetting the
“right” price is, however, costly in many ways.
The time and effort expended by senior staff to set
prices, and the cost of communicating the price
changes toclients, are not trivial. As well, if customers
are unhappy with the new price, the firm may incur
negotiation costs, or may lose customers.1
Firms’ attempts to minimize these costs by allowing
their market prices to respond slowly to market condi-
tions inﬂuence how monetary policy affects the econ-
omy. The extent to which prices are unchanged is
referred to as price stickiness, rigidity, or inﬂexibility.
In this article, we summarize the results of a survey of
pricing behaviour of Canadian companies. We begin
by examining the motivation for surveying ﬁrms. The
methodology used to set up the questionnaire and
conduct the interviews is then described, followed by
a presentation of the survey results. The ﬁrst part of
this section focuses on how often firms adjust prices
and what motivates them to do so. The second part
examines the reasons for price rigidity. The conclud-
ing section of the article highlights the main findings
of the survey and discusses some potential implica-
tions for monetary policy.
1.  The costs of printing new menus, catalogues, and price lists and of chang-
ing price tags are traditionally referred to as menu costs in the economic liter-
ature. Zbaracki et al. (2003) estimate that the managerial costs of adjusting
prices, which include the costs of gathering information, making decisions,
and communicating information internally,  are more than six times larger
than traditional menu costs for a typical ﬁrm in an industrial setting. They
also estimate that customer costs, which include the costs of communicating
and negotiating new prices with customers, are more than twenty times
larger than menu costs.
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Why the Issue Is Important
Why study how prices are determined?
The way ﬁrms set prices is of major importance to the
designandimplementationofmonetarypolicy.Whether
prices are sticky—that is, whether they respond slowly
to changes in the economic environment—or whether
they respond asymmetrically to excess demand and
excess supply are key questions for central banks. The
answers to these two questions have implications for
the conduct of monetary policy, such as the speed with
which the monetary authorities attempt to bring inﬂa-
tion back to the target after a shock. They also shape
the process by which changes in monetary policy are
transmitted to real activity (output and employment)
and to inﬂation.
The way ﬁrms set prices is of major
importance to the design and
implementation of monetary policy.
Views on the importance of price stickiness as a central
question in macroeconomics have varied over the years.
In the 1960s and 1970s, economists generally accepted
the presence of sticky prices and their ability to gener-
ate real-side disturbances in the face of monetary pol-
icy shocks. In the late 1970s and the 1980s, much of the
academic research focused on the real side of the econ-
omy. Two economic paradigms at the time, the early
rational-expectations and real-business-cycle models,
dismissed the presence of sticky prices and therefore
argued against a role for monetary policy in stimulat-
ing growth during periods of slack demand. This may
have reﬂected, at least in part, the lack of conclusive
evidence on the extent and importance of sticky prices.
In contrast, the macroeconomic literature of the 1990s
and 2000s has shown a general acceptance of price
stickiness and the important role that monetary policy
can play in an economy running below potential. Con-
sequently, economists have been devoting substantial
resources to assessing the degree of price stickiness.2
An approach that has become increasingly popular in
2.   Several studies have shown that certain wholesale and retail prices often
remain unchanged for many months. For instance, price rigidity was found in
industrial commodity prices (Carlton 1986), magazine prices (Cecchetti 1986),
and mail-order catalogue prices (Kashyap 1995). Bils and Klenow (2002),
using disaggregated Bureau of Labor Statistics price data for the United States,
found price adjustment more flexible than was the case in these earlier studies.
trying to shed light on these issues is to survey firms
directly on how they set prices. This article reports on
the results of the ﬁrst such survey for Canada.
Why do a survey?
There are several reasons why surveys of the price-set-
ting behaviour of firms have been growing in popularity
among researchers. Most important is the recognition
of the central role played by the relative stickiness of
prices in inﬂuencing how changes in monetary policy
affect real economic variables such as output and
employment. As well, conventional approaches to
investigating price stickiness, based on econometric
analysis of aggregate time-series data, have failed to
resolve many of the outstanding issues. Moreover, new
theories for sluggish price adjustment have appeared
before older explanations have been satisfactorily
rejected.3 There is also a growing recognition that
price stickiness can best be understood by examining
pricing behaviours at the micro level, where pricing
decisions are actually made. However, until the release
of ﬁrm-based survey studies in recent years, the scope
of earlier micro-level studies, which tended to focus
on either a single ﬁrm or a single market, was too nar-
row to permit implications to be drawn for price stick-
iness in the broader economy.
An economy-wide survey of the price-setting process
at ﬁrms has not previously been conducted in Canada,
although surveys have been carried out by central
banks in other countries.4 It was thought that a similar
ﬁrm-based survey for Canada would be beneficial,
given the differences in economic structure between
Canada and these other countries in terms of export
exposure, industrial mix, and institutional and market
arrangements.
In addition to assessing the relative ﬂexibility of prices
in Canada, a ﬁrm-based survey can be used to exam-
ine the various explanations for slow price adjustment
and the prevalence of these explanations across ﬁrms.
This information may be important for the conduct of
monetary policy because different explanations of price
rigidity may have different effects on the responsive-
3.  For a fuller discussion, see Blinder et al. (1998, 8–12).
4.  The use of surveys to analyze the price-setting behaviour of firms was pio-
neered in the United States by Blinder (1991, 1994) and Blinder et al. (1998).
Subsequent price-setting surveys were conducted by researchers at the Bank of
England (Hall, Walsh, and Yates 1997), the Bank of Japan (Nakagawa, Hattori,
and Takagawa 2000), the Bank of Sweden (Apel, Friberg, and Hallsten 2001),
and, more recently, the Bank of Italy (Fabiani, Gattulli, and Sabbatini 2004).
Currently, eight other euro-area central banks are conducting price-setting
surveys (Belgium, Germany, France, Spain, the Netherlands, Luxembourg,
Portugal, and Austria), and the results are expected to be published in 2005.31 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • WINTER 2004–2005
ness of prices to changing demand conditions. Mac-
roeconomic modelling may also benefit from more
detailed information on ﬁrms’ price-setting behaviour.
The Approach
How was the survey conducted?
The design and implementation of the survey for
Canada drew upon the results and lessons learned
frompreviousprice-settingstudiesconductedinother
countries. Structured interviews were conducted with
170 firms across Canada. The firms selected for the
survey had to be free to set their prices autonomously
in response to market conditions. Thus, the sample was
designed to be representative of the private, for-proﬁt,
unregulated,andnon-commodity-producingsegment
of the Canadian economy in terms of industry sector,
Construction 10 10 –– – –
Manufacturing 25 26 –– – –
Retail and
wholesale trade 17 14 –– – –
Transportation,
information, and
cultural industries 11 13 –– – –
Finance, insurance,
and real estate 19 16 –– – –
Other commercial
servicesd 18 20 –– – –
Small –– 29 32 ––
Medium –– 23 28 ––
Large –– 48 40 ––
Atlantic Canada –– –– 61 3
Quebec –– ––21 22
Ontario –– ––42 31
Prairies –– ––18 18
British Columbia –– ––13 16
Table 1
Representativeness of the Survey Sample
Industry sectora Firm sizeb Regionc
Target Actual Target Actual Target Actual
a. The target is the percentage of real gross domestic product (GDP) in the private, non-
regulated, and non-primary sector of the Canadian economy. It constituted 68 per cent
of total real GDP in 2002. The real estate sector was adjusted down by about one-half to
account for the effects of imputed rent in published GDP ﬁgures. “Actual” represents
the percentage of ﬁrms in the survey sample. The classiﬁcation by industry sector is
based upon the North American Industry Classiﬁcation System (NAICS).
b. The target is the percentage of employment in a particular ﬁrm-size category in 2002,
based on Bank estimates generated from Statistics Canada’s Survey of Employment, Pay-
roll and Hours. “Actual” represents the percentage of ﬁrms in the price-survey sample.
Small ﬁrms are deﬁned as those with less than 101 employees; medium ﬁrms as those
with 101–499 employees; and large ﬁrms as those with more than 499 employees.
c. The target is the percentage of real GDP in 2002. “Actual” represents the percentage of
ﬁrms in the price-survey sample.
d. Includes professional, scientiﬁc, and technical services; management of companies and
enterprises; administrative and support services; waste management and remediation
services; arts, entertainment, and recreation services; and accommodation and food
services.
firm size, and, to some extent, regional distribution
(Table 1).
Drawing upon the experience of the Bank of Canada’s
regional offices in conducting firm-based surveys, a
non-random form of sampling, widely employed in
business surveys and known as “quota sampling,”5
was used to generate a representative sample of ﬁrms.
All surveys were completed using face-to-face inter-
views rather than by telephone, mail, fax, or the Inter-
net, in the belief that survey responses would be more
reliable.6 All interviewers were Bank of Canada staff
economists who had training in clarifying concepts,
ensuring that all questions were answered, and identi-
fying and resolving any inconsistencies in responses.
Company representatives who participated in the sur-
vey held senior positions, suggesting that they would
know how their firm’s products or services were
priced.7 Survey interviews were conducted from July
2002 to March 2003. However, about two-thirds of the
surveys were completed between January and March
2003, a period when the Canadian dollar appreciated
by about 7 per cent, and the rate of inﬂation, as meas-
ured by the 12-month rate of increase in the consumer
price index (CPI), rose to an average of 4.4 per cent,
from less than 3 per cent when surveying commenced
in July 2002.8
What were ﬁrms asked?
The price-setting survey was based on a structured
questionnaire rather than a free-form interview to
allow for standard statistical analysis. The number,
type, and phrasing of the questions, as well as the lay-
out of the survey, were ﬁnalized in consultation with
Bank of Canada senior management and Research
Department staff. Consideration was given to striking
5. See Martin (2004) for a description of the Bank of Canada’s regional ofﬁces’
survey experience. The non-random sampling used in the regional ofﬁces and
in the price survey is called quota sampling because, for each subgroup in a
target universe, a quota of respondents is selected which, when aggregated, is
intended to produce a sample that is representative of the target universe.
Thus, in instances where an initial company contact chooses not to participate
in the survey, another ﬁrm of similar size with comparable industry charac-
teristics is selected from commercial business directories to achieve sample
targets (see also OECD 2003).
6. Blinder et al. (1998) believed that personal interviews conducted by knowl-
edgeable economic professionals would improve the quality of the survey
results. Our experience with missing responses and errors with question-
naires sent in by fax suggests that their preference for personal interviews is
well founded.
7. The percentage distribution of company contacts was as follows: president,
CEO, or owner–22 per cent; vice-president, vice-president of ﬁnance, or CFO–
41 per cent; manager or director–22 per cent; controller–9 per cent.
8.   The rise in total CPI inﬂation resulted mainly from price increases for
energy and auto insurance. Excluding these components, the year-over-year
increase in consumer prices averaged 2.3 per cent from January to March 2003.32 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • WINTER 2004–2005
a reasonable balance between gathering pertinent
information and not overburdening the respondents.
Given that most ﬁrms sell a variety of products, ﬁrms
were asked to refer to their main product when respond-
ing to the survey questions. If product offerings were
too diverse to easily identify one main product (e.g.,
department store) respondents were asked to answer
the questions with reference to some broad product
category where items are priced similarly (e.g., elec-
tronic equipment).
The survey questionnaire consisted of three sections.9
The first section contained questions on firm characteris-
tics such as cost structure, industry, sales distribution
by customer type and region, share of sales under con-
tract, customer concentration, and the number of direct
competitors. These questions were posed to allow
for the analysis of differences in price-setting behaviour
across firms. The second section included questions
designed to improve the understanding of the price-
setting process at firms. To examine the degree of price
flexibility, companies were asked about the frequency of
their price reviews and price changes. To better under-
stand the motivation behind a ﬁrm’s decision to alter
prices, the survey probed into the reasons why a com-
pany would change prices. The third section asked
questions about the relevance of various theories of, or
explanations for, price stickiness. In the main part
of this section, companies were asked to evaluate the
importance of six theories of price rigidity. These theo-
rieshadbeenconsideredimportantinotherprice-survey
studies or in other empirical or theoretical research.
Each theory was presented using a one-line statement
capturing its essential features in non-technical lan-
guage. If respondents recognized this one-line statement
as an explanation for slow price adjustment at their
firm, follow-up questions were asked on issues specific
to that theory before moving ontothenexttheory.This
section also included a single question on the relevance
of five other explanations for delayed price adjustment,
but was not followed by any supplementary questions,
given the smaller role played by these explanations
in the economic literature. At the end of the survey,
firms were asked whether their responses applied to
a broad range of their other products or services, and
this was generally found to be the case.10
9.  See Appendix A of Amirault, Kwan, and Wilkinson (forthcoming) for a
copy of the survey.
10. More than three-quarters of ﬁrms indicated that the responses were appli-
cable to other products or services or that the question was irrelevant because
they offered only one product or service.
The Results
How, and how often, do ﬁrms adjust prices?
In order to generate estimates of price-setting frequen-
cies among Canadian firms,11 the respondents were
asked, “In the past 12 months, how many times have
you actually adjusted transactions prices?” The distri-
bution of answers to this question was surprisingly
wide. The most commonly cited answer, given by 27 per
cent of the sample, was that prices are adjusted once a
year and often at the same time every year.
Another 8 per cent cited no price changes at all in the
past year (Chart 1). Taking these two results together,
prices for about one-third of the measured Canadian
economy are quite sticky. For these ﬁrms, the costs of
changing prices12 are burdensome relative to the
beneﬁts.
For 38 per cent of the sample, prices change 2 to 12 times
per year. At the other end of the distribution, 29 per cent
reported adjusting prices more than 12 times in the
past year. At the extreme end, 6 per cent reported
changing prices more than 365 times in the past year.
11.  It should be noted that the number of price adjustments alone does not
indicate price rigidity. Infrequent price adjustment at some ﬁrms may simply
reﬂect stability in their demand and cost conditions over the 12-month period
covered by the question.
12.  Costs of price changes are deﬁned broadly to include both explicit costs,
such as the costs of posting new prices, and implicit costs, such as lost or
antagonized customers, price wars, and loss of reputation and credibility.
Chart 1
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This suggests that the classical paradigm of continu-
ously clearing auction markets (continuous costless
repricing) applies to only a very small segment of Cana-
dian product markets. This high price flexibility is
largely the result of many of these ﬁrms changing
prices on a customer-by-customer basis.
Our estimates show that one-half of ﬁrms in Canada
change their prices at least once every three months,
the equivalent of a price change four or more times a
year. This result suggests that prices in Canada are
reasonably ﬂexible, particularly when compared with
the results of similar studies recently conducted in
other countries13 (Box 1).
Are prices more ﬂexible than they used to be?
The Canadian economy has undergone considerable
change over the past decade and a half. In addition to
lower, more stable, and predictable inﬂation,  which,
on the surface, may have reduced the need for frequent
13.   Survey results on price ﬂexibility are consistent with the ﬁndings
reported in Bils and Klenow (2002).
price changes, firms have faced a steady stream of
technological innovation, new trade arrangements,
improvements in public sector finances, and other
developments that may have altered their price-setting
behaviour. To better understand the impact of these
influences, firms were asked, “To the best of your
knowledge, has the frequency of price adjustment
changed in the past decade?” The evidence suggests that
prices in Canada have become more ﬂexible over the
past decade. While slightly more than half of the sample
hadnotchangedthefrequencywithwhichtheyadjusted
prices over the past decade, 45 per cent had adjustedit.
Three-quarters of firms in this latter group now change
prices more often than they did a decade ago.
The evidence suggests that prices in
Canada have become more ﬂexible
over the past decade.
Box 1
A Comparison of Selected Price-Setting Surveys
Timing April 1990– September March– July 2002– Median frequency
March 1992 1995 May 2000 March 2003 of price changes
Sample size 200 654 626 170 per year 1.4 2 1 4
Representative Yes No, mainly No, Yes Most frequently cited
by industry? manufac- manufac- price-change
turing turing and frequency per
ﬁrms (68%) service year (i.e., mode) 1 1 1 1
sectors Results: Coordination Cost-based Implicit Cost-based
only Highest ranked failure pricing contracts pricing
Representative No, ﬁrms No, Yes Yes theories of price Non-price Implicit Explicit Customer
by ﬁrm size? with dominated stickinessb adjustment contracts contracts relationships
<$10 million by large Cost-based Explicit Cost-based Explicit
in sales ﬁrms pricing contracts pricing contracts
excluded Implicit Procyclical Coordina- Non-price
Regional 16 states in All regions All regions All regions contracts elasticitya tion failure adjustment
distribution? U.S. Northeast Explicit Pricing Counter- Coordination
contracts thresholdsa cyclical failure
Random sample? Yes No Yes No cost of
ﬁnancea
Comparing the Bank of Canada Survey with Three Previous Surveys
Survey features Key results
United United Sweden Canada United United Sweden Canada
States Kingdom States Kingdom
a. Not surveyed in the Bank of Canada study
b. Rankings for the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canadian studies are based upon the percentage of ﬁrms that recognized a particular theory, whereas rankings for the
Swedish study are based on mean scores. Mean scores take into consideration the subjective responses of the ﬁrms to a particular theory. In the Canadian study, mean scores
could only be calculated for the six main theories, and the rankings are identical to those based on percentage recognition.34 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • WINTER 2004–2005
Firms with increased price ﬂexibility were asked why
they had adjusted their pricing behaviour. Three factors
were noted (in order of importance): increased competi-
tion, increased use of information technology, and
increased volatility of input costs.
As many firms explained, more competition means
that their price in the market is wrong or “offside”
more often, and the costs of being offside increase dra-
matically as competition increases. Information tech-
nology, for its part, acts as a tool to facilitate price
reviews and adjustments, in that it enhances the
information flow, thereby reducing costs and lags asso-
ciated with the price-setting process. The third factor,
increased volatility in input costs, was related to vol-
atility in foreign exchange rates and raw material
and energy prices.
Why does pricing behaviour vary among
ﬁrms?
Several firm characteristics were found to be statistically
significant factors influencing firm-level price-set-
ting behaviour (Table 2).14
Sectors: Price changes are most infrequent at ﬁrms in
the “other commercial services” sector, where they are
generally reviewed and set annually. Many of these
service ﬁrms described the annual price change as
synchronized to the annual wage settlement with staff.15
Firms in retail and wholesale trade are at the other end
of the distribution, with a median of seven price changes
per year. Other sectors are clustered near the centre,
with three to ﬁve price changes per year.16
Firm size: Large firms change prices about twice as
often as medium firms and five times more frequently
than small ﬁrms.17 Many respondents explained that
senior staff at small ﬁrms have numerous tasks in
addition to reviewing and adjusting prices. The
administrative and management costs associated
with the price-setting process are therefore particularly
onerous for small ﬁrms.
Number of competitors: A firm’s market circumstances
play a role in determining its price-setting behaviour.
14. To the extent that characteristics such as the breakdown of ﬁrms by sector
and size are found to be signiﬁcant, they highlight the importance of having a
representative sample when drawing conclusions about economy-wide
behaviour.
15. These ﬁrms conform to standard staggered contract models such as those
proposed by Taylor (1979).
16. TheseresultsaresimilartothosefoundinHall,Walsh,andYates(1997).They
show that construction and retail firms have the highest frequency of price
adjustment, while firms in other service industries have the lowest frequency.
17.  Buckle and Carlson (2000) also find that small firms change prices less frequently.
For example, firms with fewer competitors tend to be
better able to resist more frequent price changes. As
previously mentioned, firms themselves reported
Total sample 170 4 34 18
Sectors**
Construction 18 5 22 6
Manufacturing 44 4 36 16
Retail and
wholesale trade 25 7 4 28
Transportation,
information, and
cultural industries 22 3 45 27
Finance, insurance,
and real estate 27 4 30 15
Other commercial
servicesb 34 1 50 15
Firm size (using # of employees)***
Small (less than 101) 54 2 39 9
Medium (101– 499) 48 4 42 15
Large (more than 499) 68 10 25 26
Geographic distribution of sales*
Export sales less than
50% of total sales 137 3 36 16
Export sales at or
more than 50%
of total sales 33 9 27 24
Number of competitors**
0-5 68 2 49 16
greater than 5 102 4 25 19
Price-review type ***
State-dependent 57 10 14 30
Time-dependent 113 2 44 12
Table 2
Characteristics That Inﬂuence Variations
in the Frequency of a Firm’s Price Adjustments
Factors leading to Number of Median Per cent of
variations in the respondents number ﬁrms reporting:
frequency of price (n) of price
adjustmentsa adjustments < 1 price > 52 price
change changes
per year per year
a. A Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test of the equality of populations was conducted. For more
information about the Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test, see Kvanli, Guynes, and Pavur
(1992).
* indicates the rejection of the null hypothesis at the 80 per cent conﬁdence level
** indicates 90 per cent conﬁdence level
*** indicates 99 per cent conﬁdence level
b. See footnote d in Table 1.35 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • WINTER 2004–2005
increased competition as a major source of increased
price ﬂexibility.
Sales distribution:18 Firms with a significant export
sales base have a higher number of median price
changes. This suggests that exposure to international
customers will tend to make firm-level pricing more
flexible. Firms focused on sales in their home region
have fewer price changes. This may help to explain
why the Canadian economy, an economy very much
open to trade, has ﬂexible prices.
Price reviews: Firms generally review prices in one
of two ways: time-dependent, using a fixed frequency
(e.g., quarterly, weekly, annually) or state-dependent,
when they perceive a change in the “state” of the mar-
ket. The majority(about two-thirds)19 of firms surveyed
exhibit time-dependent price-reviewing behaviour.
Firms with time-dependent price reviews have far
stickier prices than do state-dependent price reviewers.
Many ﬁrms reporting state-dependent price reviews
offer different prices to different customers for the
same, or similar, products.
What causes ﬁrms to change prices?
Another important issue for the conduct of monetary
policy is what causes ﬁrms to change prices. Whatever
triggers a price change is the theoretical ﬁrst step in a
microeconomic process that will ultimately lead to a
change in the rate of inﬂation.
Respondents ranked “price changes
by competitors” as the most
important factor leading ﬁrms to
change prices.
Table 3 illustrates the dominant role competitive forces
play in driving price changes. Respondents ranked
“price changes by competitors” as the most important
factor leading ﬁrms to change prices. Following com-
petitor actions, “changes in domestic input costs” and
“changes in demand” were cited as equally important
factors, suggesting both supply-side and demand-side
factors are at play.20 Wage changes were next in the
18.  Firms were asked to respond to the question using the currency of their
main business activity. This implies that daily exchange rate ﬂuctuations were
not considered a source of price ﬂexibility.
19.   Results contained in Hall, Walsh, and Yates (1997) are similar.
rankings, followed by several other factors of similar
importance.
Depending on the industry, however, rankings do differ.
For example, goods-producing industries consistently
ranked domestic non-labour input costs higher in
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forecast 2.01 7 5 9 9 6 4 7
Change in ex-
change rates 1.87 8 9 4 5 9 9 8
Sales
campaigns 1.84 9 8 8 6 7 7 9
Table 3
Rankings and Mean Score of
Reasons for Price Adjustments
Triggers/ Total sample CONS MFG R&WT TIC FIRE OCS
Causesa
Mean Rankc Rankings based on mean score
scoreb
* CONS = Construction, MFG = Manufacturing, R&WT = Retail and Wholesale
Trade, TIC = Transportation, Information, and Culture, FIRE = Finance, Insurance,
and Real Estate, OCS = Other Commercial Services.
a Firms were also asked about directives from parent companies. The response was insig-
niﬁcant, scoring last in all industries, and so is excluded from this table.
b The mean score in column 2 is the weighted average of the ﬁrms’ response to the
importance of each trigger, where 4 is “very important,” and 1 is “not important.” The
numbers in columns 3 to 9 are rankings for the importance of each trigger for a given
industry.
c Ranking based on the total sample
d Mean score is statistically different at the 5 per cent level of signiﬁcance from the mean
score below it36 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • WINTER 2004–2005
importance than did firms in service-producing indus-
tries, where changes in demand ranked higher.
Wages were most important in the “other commercial
services”sector—apointpreviouslyidentifiedasleading
to annual price-setting behaviour. Economic and inﬂa-
tion forecasts were of some importance to the ﬁnance,
insurance, and real estate and construction sectors.
Exchange rates were most important to manufactur-
ers, wholesalers, and retailers.
Why might prices be rigid?
The study assessed 11 explanations for holding prices
steady even though there are pressures for a change.
These theories were proposed to firms as a series of
short, plain-language statements and are listed in
Table 4, along with the percentage of ﬁrms that recog-
nized these various theories as reasons why prices may
change infrequently.
The results indicate that cost-based pricing,
customer relations, explicit contracts, and
non-price adjustment were the theories
most recognized by respondents.
Each theory attributes sticky price behaviour to specific
causes. For example, sticky information describes
ﬁrms as making the best decision with the information
available at the time. However, that information is
subject to lags and is updated infrequently. Other theo-
ries give institutional arrangements, such as contracts,
both written and unwritten, an important role in price
rigidities. These agreements between parties, whether
they are explicit or implicit, often ﬁx prices as a means
of protecting one or both parties, but also reduce the
opportunities to adjust prices. Cost-based pricing sug-
gests that prices of ﬁnal goods adjust to costs with a
lag. This lag depends on how quickly individual ﬁrms
revise prices to reﬂect changes in costs and the length
of the multi-stage production process for a ﬁnal good.
Given the ﬁrm-speciﬁc focus of the survey, questions
on cost centred on the firm-level responses to costs, not
the chain-of-production process among ﬁrms. Coordi-
nation failure attributes price stickiness to the prefer-
ences of ﬁrms to hold back on a price change and wait
for other ﬁrms to change their prices ﬁrst. If all ﬁrms
behave this way, a required price change may not go
ahead for some time.
Menu and customer relations costs suggest that there
are ﬁxed costs associated with adjusting prices, and
that these costs force ﬁrms to reduce the number of
adjustments they undertake. Non-price adjustment
proposes that ﬁrms change the characteristics of their
product or service instead of changing prices. Low
inflation may also make it difficult for firms to
adjust prices because price changes are immediately
viewed as real price changes as opposed to nominal
price changes. Finally, we included a category based
on results from pretesting that suggest that factors
influencing prices do not change often enough to
warrant changing prices more often.
The results indicate that cost-based pricing, customer
relations, explicit contracts, and non-price adjustment
were the theories most recognized by respondents.
Sticky information and menu costs were the least rec-
ognized (Table 4). It should also be noted that theory
recognition by ﬁrms is not mutually exclusive. For
example, ﬁrms might indicate that they hold back on a
price increase (i.e., coordination failure) because they
fear antagonizing customers (i.e., customer relations).
Do costs matter?
As we noted in the section on what causes companies
to change prices, input costs play an important role in
the price-setting process. These results are conﬁrmed
here. Cost-based pricing was the most widely recog-
nized theory among respondents, with 67 per cent
of the sample accepting it as a reason for price inertia
(Table 4). This theory suggests that there are lags
between cost and price changes at ﬁrms and at differ-
ent stages of production across ﬁrms.
Even though the lags between cost and price changes
may be short, some researchers have suggested that,
when multiplied by the various levels in the chain of
production across ﬁrms, they may cause considerable
price inertia in ﬁnal consumer prices (Gordon 1981;
Blanchard 1983). However, firms were asked questions
about their own behaviour, so the survey provides
information only on the lags in cost and price changes
at the ﬁrm, not across ﬁrms.
The results of this survey indicate that a lag does indeed
exist between changes in costs and changes in prices
at the firm level. Even when these firms expect an
increase in input costs, fully 61 per cent of the firms
that accepted cost-based pricing indicated that they
would delay price changes. In fact, many firms actively
try to hold back price increases. For example, if they
foresee a cost increase, 38 per cent report buying in
advance and storing inventory, and 26 per cent report
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are more typical in goods-producing sectors, which can
more effectively hedge or store their inputs. Beyond
these sources of inertia, some ﬁrms report having to
give customers advance notice—as much as six
months—of a price increase. This creates another
wedge between cost shocks and price responses.
Do contracts matter?
Explicit contracts ﬁx prices over a speciﬁed period of
time and have long been recognized as a source of price
stickiness. Survey results show that 75 per cent of
Canadian ﬁrms use contracts. Because some contracts
include price escalator or de-escalator clauses or may
not fix prices, only 45 per cent of the sample recognized
explicitcontractsasinhibitingpriceincreases.21About
Cost-based pricing Prices depend mainly on the costs
of labour and raw materials used in
producing goods and services.
Therefore, prices don’t change until
costs change. 67.1
Customer relations Prices could not change more often
without disturbing customer relations. 55.3
Explicit contracts Firms would like to adjust prices more
often to reﬂect market conditions, but
ﬁxed-price contracts make it difﬁcult
to pass on price increases when a
contract is active. 45.3
Non-price adjustment Firms are more likely to amend
product characteristics (e.g., warranty,
delivery lag) than prices. 44.1
Coordination failure Firms delay price increases because
(rising prices) they do not want to be the ﬁrst in the
industry to raise prices. 41.2
Low inﬂation Low inﬂation makes large price
changes more noticeable. 33.5
Implicit contracts Firms delay price increases because
they have an implied understanding
with customers that they will not raise
prices in tight markets. 31.8
Coordination failure Firms delay price cuts because they
(falling prices) do not want to be the ﬁrst in the
industry to cut prices. 31.2
Factors do not change Factors inﬂuencing prices do not
change often enough to warrant
changes. 31.2
Menu costs It would be too costly to change
prices more often (e.g., time, effort,
out-of-pocket costs). 21.2
Sticky information The information used to review (and
ultimately change) prices is available
infrequently. Therefore, prices may
be slow to adjust to new conditions. 13.5
Table 4
Percentage of Firms That Recognized Each
Theory as a Reason for Infrequent Price Changes
Theories Description given Percentage
to respondents recognition
29 per cent of these ﬁrms reported that contracts did
not prevent prices from decreasing when demand or
costs fell. This result suggests that explicit contracts
introduce somewhat more price inertia when prices
are rising than when they are falling.
How long are prices fixed under explicit contracts?
The most frequently cited contract length was
12 months, but owing to the existence of long-lived
contracts, the average contract length was 23 months.
Contract lengths have generally remained unchanged
over the past 10years, despite low rates of inflation over
this period.
Implicit contracts, which are a verbal commitment
not to raise prices in strong markets, were acknowl-
edged as an explanation for price rigidity by about 32
per cent of firms. However, about two-thirds of these
firms indicated that this commitment is not recipro-
cated by customers, who demand price concessions
in weak markets. This suggests that implicit contracts
also constrain prices more when market conditions
strengthen than when they weaken. This asymmetric
effect on price adjustment is more pronounced with
implicit than with explicit contracts.
Does competition matter?
Coordination failure (not moving prices before one’s
competitors) on a price increase was recognized by
41 per cent of the sample. However, only 31 per cent
recognized this as an explanation for price rigidity
when prices are declining. This result suggests more
price inertia when prices are rising than when they are
falling. When ﬁrms were asked why prices were not
increased until their competitors moved, the main
response was a fear of losing or antagonizing
customers.
Asymmetrical effects are present in another interesting
way. Firms that identify themselves as price leaders in
an industry should be the ones who identify least with
this theory, since a price leader, by deﬁnition, would
move prices without regard for its competitors. How-
ever, results show that even ﬁrms that identify them-
selves as the price leader in their industry have an
asymmetrical reaction to coordination failure. The
market leader shows little reluctance in initiating a
price decrease. However, on a price increase, the price
leader is just as worried as other ﬁrms about the nega-
tive consequences. This is a particularly interesting
result because it shows that competitive forces are
important.
21.  The price rigidity implied by ﬁrms recognizing ﬁxed-price contracts is
lessened to the extent that slightly more than 10 per cent of these ﬁrms use
contracts for fewer than 50 per cent of total sales.38 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • WINTER 2004–2005
Do customer relationships matter?
The fear of antagonizing customers is a key issue and
underscoredmuchofthefirms’commentaryaboutwhat
makes changing prices difﬁcult. Firms were explicitly
asked if the costs of maintaining customer relations
were a source of price inertia. This theory was ranked
second highest as an explanation for price stickiness.
Respondents felt that customers disliked frequent
changes and “expected” stability.22 Firms were con-
cerned about being perceived as unprofessional if
they changed their prices too often.
The fear of antagonizing customers is
a key issue and underscored much of
the ﬁrms’ commentary about what
makes changing prices difﬁcult.
Perhaps the most compelling evidence on customer
relations costs comes from Table 5, which shows the
entire sample of ﬁrms divided into four groups based
22.   Okun (1981) suggested that ﬁrms limit price changes because frequent
changes would increase customers’ search and shopping costs and would
therefore antagonize them.
on the frequency with which the firms adjust prices.
Here, the importance of customer relations truly stands
out. Fully 76 per cent of firms with fewer than two
adjustments recognized this factor as a source of price
rigidity, compared with 37 per cent who adjust prices
more than 52 times a year. Customer relations costs
have played only a peripheral role in mainstream the-
oretical work. Recently, however, theorists (Rotem-
berg 2002, 2004) have begun to model price rigidity
on the basis of customer relations costs.
Table 5 also points to other interesting patterns. For
example, the firms with the most rigid prices have
recognition rates for all theories that are similar to or
higher than those of their counterparts with flexible
prices. Furthermore, some theories with low recognition
overall have significantly higher acceptance among
the lowest frequency price setters. Menu costs were
acknowledged by only 21 per cent of the respondents
overall, but by 38 per cent of firms with fewer than
2 changes. Only 3 per cent of firms with more than
52 price changes per year accepted this explanation.
Firms for which menu costs matter clearly set prices
less frequently. On the question of whether low inflation
makes large price changes morenoticeable, firms with
sticky prices were, again, significantly more sensitive
to the possibility that price changes above the rate of
inﬂation would attract negative attention from cus-
tomers.
Cost-based pricing 67.1 69.0 74.4 62.8 60.0 0.7 0.565 none
Customer relations 55.3 75.9 59.0 37.2 36.7 7.4** 0.000 1&3,** 1&4**
Explicit contracts 45.3 34.5 43.6 53.5 50.0 0.9 0.438 none
Non-price adjustments 44.1 46.6 46.2 41.9 40.0 0.2 0.921 none
Coordination failure (rising prices) 41.2 48.3 41.0 39.5 30.0 0.9 0.429 none
Low inflation 33.5 48.3 25.6 25.6 26.7 2.9** 0.034 1&2,* 1&3*
Implicit contracts 31.8 37.9 33.3 27.9 23.3 0.8 0.511 none
Coordination failure (falling prices) 31.2 29.3 30.8 37.2 26.7 0.4 0.779 none
Factor stability 31.2 48.3 30.8 20.9 13.3 5.1** 0.002 1&3,** 1&4**
Menu costs 21.2 37.9 20.5 11.6 3.3 6.5** 0.000 1&3,* 1&4,** 2&4*
Sticky information 13.5 17.2 15.4 11.6 6.7 0.7 0.550 none
Table 5
Percentage Recognition of Pricing Theory by Frequency of Price Adjustment
Theory Whole Frequency of price F-test valuesa Probability of Statistically signiﬁcant
sample adjustment per year no variation differences  between
the column numbersb
0–1 2–4 5–52 >52
n =5 8 n =3 9 n = 43 n =3 0
Col. 1 Col. 2 Col. 3 Col. 4
a. *indicates rejection of null hypothesis of equal means at the 10 per cent level
** indicates rejection of null hypothesis of equal means at the 5 per cent level
b. Two-sample t-test assuming unequal variances. Critical values of tests were corrected using a Bonferroni normalization, which corrects for the possibility of falsely accepting signiﬁcant
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Conclusions
This survey of the pricing behaviour of a representative
sample of Canadian ﬁrms has several interesting ﬁnd-
ings. Firms show wide variation in the frequency with
which they adjust prices, with half of Canadian ﬁrms
changing prices at least once every three months. The
survey also found evidence of increased price flexi-
bility among Canadian firms over the past decade,
owing to intensified competition and greater use of
information technologies.
Several characteristics of ﬁrms inﬂuence price-setting
behaviour. Small ﬁrms, service sector ﬁrms, and ﬁrms
with a large proportion of domestic sales adjust prices
relativelyinfrequently.Asforwhatleadsfirmstoadjust
prices, price changes by a competitor were the most
important trigger. In aggregate, ﬁrms ranked supply
anddemand factors as equally important triggers of
a price change.
Beyond understanding how firms set prices, this study
was equally concerned with understanding the reasons
for price inertia. In particular, ﬁrms reacted favoura-
bly to the idea that prices do not change until a ﬁrm
has seen its costs change. Firms were also concerned
about adjusting prices ahead of their competition. In
addition, some ﬁrms using sales contracts hold nomi-
nal prices fixed, regardless of market conditions that
would otherwise call for a change in price.
These theories as to why proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms may
keep prices unchanged, despite pressures to adjust
them, seem to have a common genesis: ﬁrms’ fears of
antagonizing customers or disturbing the goodwill or
reputationdevelopedwiththem.Thetheoryofcustomer
relations was the second most popular choice overall
and was accepted by three-quarters of ﬁrms with the
stickiest prices.
Given that customers are more likely to be antagonized
by a price hike than by a price cut, we would expect
fewer rigidities in cutting prices than raising prices.
Firms were queried about these possible asymmetries.
Evidence suggests that firms may face more price
inertia when experiencing upward price pressures
than when experiencing downward price pressures.
Some implications of these results are worth considering
despite the caveats that may be attached to this analy-
sis. If, as we have found in this survey, prices in Canada
are relatively ﬂexible and have become more ﬂexible
over time, inflation may be more responsive to interest
rate changes. Thus, inﬂation targets could be achieved
with shorter lags and with less impact on activity in
the real economy. Moreover, greater flexibility not
only reduces the effects of monetary policy on the real
economy, but also reduces the need for countercyclical
policy.
The asymmetrical response of prices to changes in
economic conditions (i.e., more ﬂexibility downward
than upward) also has implications for the conduct of
monetary policy. For one, this result runs counter to
recent concerns that prices are more sticky downwards
than upwards. Similar asymmetries and implications
were found by Blinder et al. (1998). While these results
are compelling, they require further validation. They
say nothing, for example, about wages, the area where
downward rigidities are thought to be more important.
While the survey offered some insights into price-setting
asymmetries, more extensive questioning and further
research would be invaluable in reﬁning these results.
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